This paper reviews the controversy over China's exchange rate regime. Placing the issue in the context of the literature on exit strategies, it argues that the best time for China to exit from its peg is now while capital is flowing in and there is a tendency for the rate to appreciate. In contrast, waiting to exit until sentiment has turned around would be problematic. In addition, moving now to a managed float would help the Chinese authorities to gain better control of domestic credit conditions. The principal objections to this recommendation (viz., the banking system is weak, many state enterprises are loss making, and the capital account is not sufficiently open) are unconvincing. Finally, the impact on other countries is likely to be more complex and varied than suggested by other analyses.
Introduction
For much of 2004 and 2005, China's currency peg has been the number-one international economic and ªnancial issue in the United States. Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) introduced legislation to impose an across-the-board tariff of 27.5 percent on imports from China to penalize the country for manipulating its currency. President George W. Bush, Secretary of the Treasury John Snow, and Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan all weighed in on the need for a more ºexible renminbi exchange rate.
Why should the renminbi be such a prominent issue in the United States? The obvious answer is the magnitude of the U.S. current account deªcit and in particular America's bilateral deªcit against China and Asia. Mainstream models point to the need for a substantial fall in the dollar to bring that deªcit down to sustainable levels. During 2003-04 the dollar fell substantially against the euro but only very modestly against Asian currencies. Beijing's continued maintenance of its dollar peg was widely cited as a reason for the reluctance of other Asian countries, which compete with China in third markets, to see their currencies rise.
For China the priority is different. Its need is to better tailor money and credit conditions to the state of Chinese economy. And the conditions that ºow from a policy of pegging the renminbi to the dollar and importing monetary conditions from the United States are no longer obviously appropriate. A manifestation of this is the rapid rate of growth of bank credit, by 17 percent in 2002 and 20 percent in 2003, a period when U.S. interest rates were unusually low. Producer price inºation in 2003 accelerated to nearly 2.5 percent. Consumer price index (CPI) inºation in 2004 then ran at 3.9 percent, and according to its 2004 fourth-quarter monetary policy report, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) forecasts the rate for 2005 to accelerate further to 4 percent. Here the decline of the dollar and hence of the renminbi against the euro, yen, and other currencies, which means higher import prices and additional demand pressure, has not been helpful. There would seem to be a prima facie case for a tighter monetary policy rather than one that is dictated by the currency peg.
Chinese ofªcials recognize these arguments but are reluctant to adopt a signiªcantly more ºexible exchange rate now. They worry that altering the rate will disturb expectations, discourage adjustment and growth, and further undermine the stability of the banking system. While acknowledging the need to eventually have a more ºexible exchange rate, they prefer to delay the transition until the ªnancial system has ªrst been strengthened and the capital account has been liberalized further, creating a deeper and more liquid foreign-exchange market. Contrary to their views, I argue in this paper that further delay is likely to be a mistake.
The other question, in addition to that of the timing of adopting a more ºexible rate, is what kind of more ºexible rate. I argue that the best strategy for China is a form of open-economy inºation targeting in which the authorities formulate monetary policy to limit deviations of inºation and growth from their respective targets. This will not imply neglect of the exchange rate; rather, it will mean intervening to limit currency ºuctuations, since the exchange rate inºuences both inºation and economic growth, the key arguments of the central bank's objective function. In practice, then, such an arrangement will combine an increase in ºexibility, which will have beneªts for the reasons described in this paper, with limits on the extent of actual volatility. It will also avoid specifying hard targets at which speculators can shoot as the capital account grows increasingly porous.
It is important to emphasize that my argument for a rapid transition to a more ºexible exchange rate is not also an argument for rapid capital account liberalization. While there are differences of opinion over how rapidly China should move to a more ºexible exchange rate, there is virtually no disagreement among scholars that the country should go slow on capital account liberalization. Unfortunately, the same distinction has not always been drawn by ofªcials. U.S. Treasury Secretary Snow, the rest of the U.S. government, and other G-7 deputies, in private meetings with Chinese ofªcials, have reportedly urged China to both freely ºoat the renminbi and open the capital account. This is inappropriate and infeasible. When one contemplates a heavily managed ºoat, which is the only kind of ºoat that is likely to be appropriate and feasible, then any argument concerning necessary links to further capital account liberalization no longer applies.
Costs and benefits of the currency peg
In the 1950s and 1960s, although China pegged to the U.S. dollar and then to the British pound, the exchange rate had little relevance for trade and resource ºows, which on the whole were directly controlled. With the breakdown of Bretton Woods, the country's single-currency peg was then replaced by a broad basket. In 1981 China devalued what had become a massively overvalued rate and temporarily introduced a separate, so-called ofªcial rate for non-trade (mainly remittances and tourism).
1 A de facto multiple-exchange-rate system was introduced in when the authorities sanctioned a formal secondary market for foreign exchange (on which foreign currency retained by exports could be traded). In 1994 China uniªed the renminbi exchange rate at the then-prevailing rate of 8.7 to the dollar. Between 1994 and 1997 the currency then appreciated by about 5 percent to the neighborhood of 8.3, after which its ºuctuations were limited by intervention. The ºuctuation band was narrowed further at the time of the Asian crisis when the currency reached a level of 8.28, where it has essentially been frozen ever since (ªgure 1). In the second half of the 1990s, as part of developing a system of direct monetary control, the growth of the money stock began replacing credit ceilings as the intermediate target of the PBOC, and a uniªed interbank money market began operating in Shanghai. The PBOC then introduced open-market operations, which have now played a role in monetary management for more than 5 years. Qualiªed commercial banks and other ªnancial institutions are authorized to trade treasury securities and to quote buy and sell rates for foreign exchange within a plus and minus 0.3 percent band.
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In practice the PBOC has intervened to limit actual ºuctuations to plus or minus 0.1 percent. (See ªgure 1.)
Benefits of the peg
The pegged exchange rate is valued for the stimulus it provides to export-led growth. In adopting the Asian model of export-led growth supported by a competitively valued exchange rate, China is pursuing a strategy previously followed by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, and other Asian economies. In recent years, exports have been far and away the fastest-growing component of Chinese GDP, rising at rates in excess of 20 percent per annum. China's utility as an export platform is also a key attraction for the foreign direct investment (FDI) that has been so important for the country's economic development.
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Change in the Renminbi Exchange Rate 2 However, interest rates on loans to small and medium-sized enterprises and rural credit cooperatives remain subject to administrative guidelines. No doubt exchange rate stability eases planning and eliminates what is at least a minor inconvenience for multinational companies and, more importantly, for the domestic private enterprises that play a growing role in the country's export drive. But econometric studies of the impact of exchange rate variability on foreign trade and investment detect at best small effects. 3 The rapid growth of Chinese exports and the incentive for foreigners to engage in direct investment reºect more than just the level of the exchange rate. Reform in China and the country's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) coincided with a rise in global outsourcing made possible by advances in information and communications technology. China is an attractive locale for outsourced production because of its abundant supplies of labor (including, increasingly, skilled labor), its long coastline, and its large potential market. A modest change in the level of the exchange rate and/or a permanent shift to a somewhat higher level of exchange rate variability might moderate export growth slightly in the short run, but they would do nothing to alter these favorable fundamentals.
Multinationals, for their part, can protect themselves from the effects of exchange rate variability by building diversiªed portfolios of production facilities and by sourcing from a number of different countries. 4 Multinational companies' joint venture partners do not enjoy the same diversiªcation (although we are now beginning to see some Chinese companies going abroad), but if temporary appreciation of the exchange rate causes them ªnancial difªculty, they can still obtain assistance from their joint venture partners. They are unlikely to be liquidity constrained, in other words. There is thus no reason why a more ºexible renminbi should make life signiªcantly more difªcult for such companies.
Note that we are talking here about the majority of Chinese exports and two-thirds of recent export growth. of exports, the impact on exports of a slightly more volatile exchange rate should be relatively weak.
The main place to worry about the impact of greater exchange rate variability is private domestically owned ªrms, which have been allowed to export directly since 1999 (instead of having to go through state-owned trade companies). These enterprises are least able to protect themselves from exchange rate changes. If currency appreciation causes them ªnancial distress, they will have to seek help from the banking system. One can reasonably question whether China's banking system is up to the task, in particular, whether its credit evaluation procedures are adequate for distinguishing temporary from chronic problems among its clients. But the impact should not be exaggerated. The share of private domestically owned ªrms in total exports is still less than 10 percent. 5 And insofar as a large share of export content takes the form of imported components, even for private domestically owned ªrms, changes in the exchange rate affect both costs and revenues in the same direction and therefore do not give rise to severe ªnancial difªculties.
Costs of the peg
None of this is to deny that a more ºexible exchange rate will complicate life for private domestically owned ªrms. But the new regime will also have signiªcant beneªts. In particular, the PBOC will be better able to limit procyclicality of money and credit. Under a pegged rate, positive shocks to productivity and growth lead to positive shocks to supplies of money and credit. Any incipient rise in domestic interest rates, which would damp down the surge in economic activity, is at least partially offset by capital inºows or declining outºows. Chinese ofªcials tend to deny the existence of this link, since the country has controls limiting the ability of banks and corporations to arbitrage domestic and foreign interest rates. If the authorities wish to limit the rate of growth of bank credit and raise the level of interest rates relative to those prevailing abroad, they can simply issue sterilization bills, thereby sopping up the additional domestic liquidity, and issue directives to the banks instructing them to lend less, as they did in 2004.
But as the capital account grows more porous, tightening domestic credit conditions by selling short-term bills and 3-year sterilization bonds just strengthens the tendency for capital to ºow in. While the PBOC has been working hard to sterilize capital inºows, it has been only partially successful. And as the Chinese economy is further liberalized, there develops an increasing number of additional channels other than the banking system through which capital can ºow in from abroad and have an impact on the domestic economy. Foreign multinationals can bring in additional funds and use them to purchase apartments as well as engage in industrial investment. Overseas Chinese can engage in similar transactions while on holiday on the mainland. Foreign banks are increasingly able to engage in such transactions as they gain a foothold, courtesy of China's membership in the WTO.
Recent studies have conªrmed the existence of a surprisingly strong link between monetary conditions in China and the United States. Ouyang and Rajan (2005) estimate the offset coefªcient (the impact of a change in net domestic assets on net foreign assets) by two-stage least squares on data starting in 1995, obtaining a coefªcient of 0.5, indicating that about half of any domestic monetary impulse is offset by induced capital ºows. It is safe to assume that this coefªcient has been trending upward over time. Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2003) analyze monetary and ªnancial linkages between China and the United States (as well as Hong Kong and Taiwan) over the period 1996-2002, taking the magnitude of the real interest differential as a measure of integration. They report that the real interest differential trends downward over time and provides "surprisingly positive" evidence of integration with the United States. Decomposing the real interest differential into the uncovered interest differential and the relative purchasing power parity differential, they ªnd that a downward trend in the former is mainly responsible for the shrinking real interest differential vis-à-vis the United States. The persistence of these differentials conªrms that Chinese capital controls continue to bite, but their declining magnitude at the same time suggests that ªnancial integration is growing increasingly tight, limiting Chinese monetary autonomy so long as the currency remains pegged.
The result is to amplify the economy's boom and bust cycles. The US$35.8 billion of non-FDI capital inºows (amounting to 2.7 percent of GDP) received by China in 2003, at the same time the economy was booming ahead, provides clear evidence of the linkage. In this episode, property market arbitrage has been the mechanism linking domestic and foreign ªnancial conditions. The expectation is that property prices in Shanghai will eventually converge with those in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Low interest rates in these other markets, which have sustained property price increases there, also thereby fuel price increases in China. When the authorities try to tighten up on bank lending to the property market, funds for real estate speculation instead ºow in from abroad, as foreign-invested enterprises divert authorized inºows into property purchases, as overseas Chinese repatriate their funds, and through a variety of other mechanisms. Another manifestation of the same problem is the growing tendency for Chinese commercial banks to balk at buying (at prevailing interest rates) the bills that the central bank issues in its effort to sterilize the impact of ªnancial inºows on the domestic money supply. The more that state banks are commercialized, the less will become the scope for using direct pressure to guide bank lending, and thus the rate of growth of the broad money supply. The very strong correlation between M2 and foreign reserves since late 2001 is additional evidence that inºows have not been fully sterilized and instead have found their way into the banking system (Ong 2004) .
Pegging the currency therefore limits the scope for moving to a market-based monetary policy because it limits the extent to which monetary conditions can move independently. In the present context, this shows up in rising real estate, commodity, and shipping prices. A weaker dollar does not help: effective (trade-weighted) depreciation and rising import prices are not helpful when the authorities' task is to combat inºation.
The peg also prevents the authorities from moving to a regime in which interest rates are used to allocate credit. Indiscriminate property lending is again the most obvious manifestation of the consequences. Property lending has been expanding by 25 percent per annum, causing investment in real estate to rise 30 percent year on year. To date, property prices have risen somewhat less rapidly, reºecting the elas-ticity of the supply response, although there are signs that the property market is heating up; at the time of writing, real estate prices in Shanghai are reportedly rising at a 30 percent annual clip. Another manifestation of this resource misallocation is the government's massive accumulation of foreign reserves, resources that are disproportionately held in low-yielding foreign government securities rather than being devoted to high-yielding private investment, or for that matter desperately sought-after domestic consumption. These are more signs that the authorities' inability to tailor domestic ªnancial conditions to local needs results in a misallocation of resources.
Then there are the implications for the banking system. In 2002, a period of unusually low interest rates in the United States, bank deposits in China rose by more than 15 percent. Given the growing reluctance of the commercial banks, as noted above, to purchase the bills used by the authorities to sterilize the effects of ªnancial inºows, bank credit surged by 17 percent. This was unhelpful in a period when questions were already being raised about the quality of investment and the sustainability of rapid growth. 6 It is inconsistent with efforts to raise bank loan standards because, other things equal, a larger volume of loans is an indication of a decline in their quality on the margin. It has encouraged the explosive growth of property lending: consumer loans, of which over 80 percent are home mortgages, now constitute 11 percent of total bank loans. They accounted for almost 25 percent of total loan growth in 2004 despite the imposition of stricter controls on mortgage loans (Ng 2005) . This creates vulnerabilities for the banking system that will be disturbingly familiar to observers of other countries.
The expedients used by the authorities have not been very effective at moderating these pressures. Increasing reserve requirements for commercial banks puts upward pressure on interest rates but only attracts additional capital inºows, given the permeability of the capital account. This is evident in the acceleration in the growth of base money following the ªrst rise in reserve requirements. The same is true of the contractionary open-market operations implemented through sales of central bank bills on the interbank market.
A radical tightening of capital controls is the one guaranteed way of reconciling domestic monetary autonomy with maintenance of the currency peg. However, the authorities have been moving in the other direction; they are committed to further 48 
Asian Economic Papers
Change in the Renminbi Exchange Rate opening the capital account prior to moving to a more ºexible exchange rate. Beginning on 1 October 2003, they authorized Chinese residents to purchase foreign exchange worth US$3,000 for each trip abroad, up from the previous limit of US$2,000.
(The amount for those who stay abroad for one-half year or longer is even higher, US$5,000.) The authorities have also liberalized restrictions on the ability of Chinese residents to enter the Hong Kong stock market. They have loosened requirements for exporting enterprises to surrender their foreign-exchange earnings. They have allowed local companies involved in international project contracting and labor services to keep foreign-exchange income from the previous year instead of having to surrender it to the authorities. They have relaxed restrictions on the ability of Chinese companies to undertake direct investments abroad. They are allowing Chinese insurance companies to add foreign assets to their investment portfolios. They are considering a Qualiªed Domestic Institutional Investor Program that would permit Chinese institutions to invest in stock and bond markets abroad. Because of the unsatisªed demand for portfolio diversiªcation on the part of Chinese residents, it is hoped that such measures will encourage a modest capital outºow and lead to somewhat tighter conditions on domestic ªnancial markets.
But the same channels that convey outºows can also convey inºows. If anything, the Chinese authorities have encouraged this process by relaxing restrictions on selected capital inºows at the same time that they have attempted to facilitate outºows (Zheng 2003a) . For example, they have signaled a readiness to authorize renminbi-denominated bond issuance by the International Finance Corporation and the Asian Development Bank. On the eve of the Communist Party Conference in 2002, they agreed to implement the Qualiªed Foreign Investor Program, which gives selected foreign investors access to China's domestic equity and debt markets. Note that foreigners engaged in portfolio investment in principle have the option of repatriating their investments on demand.
All this means that the measures taken by the authorities do little to insulate domestic markets from global ªnancial conditions. If anything they have the opposite effect. This has hindered efforts to raise lending standards in the banking system and heightened the fragility of the currency peg, as evident most recently in the massive capital inºows motivated by expectations that it will not be possible for the authorities to maintain the peg indeªnitely.
What kind of new regime?
Assume that the case for a change in China's exchange rate is granted. What then should be the nature of the adjustment and the form of the new regime?
A step revaluation
A substantial one-time revaluation would diminish protectionist pressure in the United States. It would also be an obvious way of cooling off the Chinese economy and ªghting inºationary pressure. But a step revaluation would not address the other problems with the peg. Once prices and costs adjust, earlier problems would simply recur. The authorities would have acquired no greater ability to tailor ªnancial and foreign-exchange-market conditions to domestic needs.
And revaluing once, by undermining the belief that the level of the exchange rate is the linchpin of policy, will encourage expectations that the authorities might revalue again. This will only worsen the problem of speculative capital ºows, in turn amplifying the procyclicality of monetary conditions. To defend the new level of the exchange rate, the authorities will have to deny that they have any intention of revaluing again, even if domestic and international disequilibria become relatively severe. Every system of pegged but adjustable exchange rates has grown increasingly rigid and unadjustable over time, as the authorities have been forced to reassure the markets that their early resort to exchange rate changes will not be repeated. Insofar as China's capital account will inevitably become more porous, the problem will worsen. For all these reasons, a one-time adjustment would only compound the exit problem.
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Another problem with a step revaluation is that there will be serious fallout if the authorities get the magnitude wrong. A revaluation that is too small will only excite expectations of a further revaluation in the not very distant future, which will worsen the problem of speculative inºows and procyclical monetary conditions. One of the ªrst rules of currency policy is not to make administered changes in exchange rates too small; the problem in the present case is knowing what too small is.
At the same time, a one-time revaluation that is too large could unnecessarily slow the growth of the Chinese economy. Garber (2003) estimates that a 10 percent revaluation would destroy (or prevent the creation of) half a million industrial jobs. Because the change in the exchange rate would presumably be a one-time event, job creation would resume subsequently. But even a temporary slowdown in urban job creation could fan political unrest, thereby undermining investor conªdence. Some estimates put China's unemployment rate at 15 percent of the labor force; this 50 Asian Economic Papers
Change in the Renminbi Exchange Rate means that dimming hopes of future employment cannot be taken lightly as a political matter (given that only one in seven members of the labor force has any form of unemployment insurance). Alternatively, the revaluation needed to balance the current account, adjusted for long-term capital inºows, is estimated to be on the order of 15 to 25 percent (see, e.g., Goldstein 2003; Merrill Lynch 2004) . These estimates strike me as too high.
Only under very optimistic scenarios will FDI inºows continue indeªnitely at the present rapid pace. Currently, much of the capital inºow into China is speculative, motivated by expectations of revaluation. Once a modest revaluation occurs and especially if the authorities then move to a managed ºoat, introducing a two-way bet, those speculative inºows will subside.
A step revaluation with a shift to a basket peg
The step revaluation could be taken as an occasion to replace the dollar peg with a peg to a broader basket that includes not only the dollar but also the euro, the yen, and the currencies of China's other principal trade partners. Retaining the peg but changing its composition would presumably do little to shake conªdence. Because the renminbi would no longer rise and fall in lockstep with the dollar, its movement in times of dollar depreciation would no longer cause such difªculties for other regions, such as Europe. Because monetary conditions would now be imported not just from the United States, but also from other countries, those monetary conditions would presumably be more stable. 9 Insofar as the sources of imported inputs and the destinations of manufactured exports are growing increasingly diverse, stability IFS.
vis-à-vis a basket peg as opposed to the dollar peg would simplify the country's international transactions overall.
But simply shifting to a basket would not address the other problems created by the maintenance of a currency peg. In particular, it would not enhance the ability of the Chinese authorities to tailor monetary conditions to domestic needs.
3.3 A step revaluation with a later shift to a float A step revaluation with a later shift to a ºoat is the essence of Goldstein and Lardy's (2003) proposal for a two-step adjustment. In the ªrst step, a one-time 15-25 percent revaluation would be accompanied by only a very slight widening of the ºuctuation band. This would then be followed by a shift to a freer ºoat, but only after the ªnancial sector had been strengthened and the capital account had been further liberalized. Floating would allow the currency to adjust to future developments: the exchange rate could adjust upward if Chinese productivity and exports continued to surge ahead or could adjust downward if the economy cooled or problems developed in the ªnancial sector. Delaying the shift to a freer ºoat until the banking sector was restructured would ensure that exchange rate ºuctuations did not give rise to serious ªnancial problems. Delaying it until the capital account had been further liberalized would mean that the foreign-exchange market would be more liquid and stabilizing capital ºows would be forthcoming.
The appropriateness of a step revaluation of the exact magnitude proposed by Goldstein and Lardy can be questioned for all the reasons enumerated above. In addition, all of the other drawbacks of the peg will remain if the shift to signiªcantly greater ºexibility is delayed. Indeed, if the authorities announce that the step revaluation will be followed by further exchange rate adjustments (presumably in the direction of further revaluation), they may worsen the problem of destabilizing capital inºows (relative to a benchmark in which there was uncertainty about the direction of future exchange rate movements). Moving immediately to a managed ºoat would not create this same danger, because a managed ºoat introduces the possibility of two-way movements in the exchange rate, making it less likely that market participants will all line up on one side of the market.
In addition, Goldstein and Lardy's rationales for delaying the transition to ºoating, and therefore for distinguishing the two steps, can be questioned. A ªrst rationale is that the Chinese banking system will be unable to cope with the additional stresses of ºoating. It is undoubtedly true that rapid capital account liberalization would create additional dangers for ªnancial stability. Big banks with extensive nonperforming loans would have an incentive to borrow offshore as a way of gam-bling for redemption. Knowing that the authorities regarded them as too big to fail, their foreign counterparts would be tempted to lend.
But my argument is not for more rapid capital account liberalization; it is for greater exchange rate ºexibility. Most advocates of greater exchange rate ºexibility do not also advocate the relaxation of restrictions on the ability of the banks to borrow offshore. To the contrary, they emphasize the need to strengthen supervision and regulation of the banking system and to retain capital account restrictions as a further form of prudential regulation.
10
Indeed, if continued tight regulation of the capital account prevents the banks from funding themselves offshore in foreign currency, while prudential supervision and regulation prevent them from making foreign-currency-denominated loans to ªrms in the nontraded goods sector, then there is no obvious reason why limited currency ºuctuations should signiªcantly compound the problems of the banks. In contrast to the situation in South Korea or Thailand in 1997, the banks have not been permitted to freely fund themselves offshore, in foreign currency; thus, they do not have signiªcant currency mismatches. (See table 1.) A substantial share of the banks' capital, recently replenished by the authorities, is nominally denominated in dollars, but this is a bookkeeping convention that is easily changed by ofªcials to prevent them from suffering capital losses in the event of appreciation. The loans of the banking system are not all extended to export-oriented enterprises whose ability to repay would be most immediately cast into doubt by an appreciation of the currency. As shown in ªgure 4, much of this lending is infrastructure credit, rural credit, and consumer credit. If a more ºexible exchange rate allows the authorities to better tailor ªnancial conditions to the economy's needs, moderating boom and bust cycles, then balance sheet risks would become easier to manage, not harder. The banking system would be stabilized so long as signiªcant currency mismatches were avoided.
None of this questions that the problems in China's banking system are serious. Estimates of nonperforming loans are on the order of 40-50 percent of GDP. Cleaning up this mess should be an urgent priority. Chinese ofªcials appreciate the problem; thus, they have recapitalized two state banks and have unveiled an incentive-based approach to reform, in which success at meeting benchmarks is rewarded with further recapitalization and access to capital markets. But the problem will not be sig-
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Change in the Renminbi Exchange Rate niªcantly compounded by a somewhat more ºexible exchange rate, assuming that they continue to go slow on liberalizing the capital account and make progress in strengthening prudential oversight of the banks. In this sense, the banking sector problem is not a valid argument for delaying the transition to a managed ºoat.
Nor is the fact that full capital account convertibility will not be implemented anytime soon. To be sure, full capital account liberalization will not be feasible until the banking system is cleaned up. But history is replete with examples of countries that have operated managed ºoats while retaining capital controls of one sort or another. One might point to European countries in the 1930s, or Japan in the 1970s, or Chile in the 1990s, or Brazil and India today.
Still, the idea that a more ºexible exchange rate is feasible only once the capital account has been fully liberalized is widely asserted, in disregard of this evidence. One possible justiªcation could be that the currency will be excessively volatile if international ªnancial transactions remain controlled. It will not be possible for most residents and foreigners to sell the renminbi when it appreciates temporarily or to buy it on the dip. And because the market is illiquid, its volatility will be greater.
This view assumes that ªnancial speculation is stabilizing and minimizes the possibility of herd behavior and self-fulªlling dynamics such as those emphasized in recent models of balance of payments crises. Both assumptions are questionable. This means that it is not obvious in practice that further opening of the capital account would reduce exchange rate volatility, other things equal. Moreover, this view ignores the fact that current account transactions also generate a supply and a demand for foreign exchange, the balance of which determines the equilibrium price of foreign currency. A look at the international economics textbooks of the 1960s and 1970s (when capital mobility was low) reveals a catalogue of models in which exports generate a ºow supply of foreign exchange and imports generate a ºow demand. 11 Most importantly, this view ignores that the central bank will remain an important provider of liquidity to the market. Even if the exchange rate is allowed somewhat more ºexibility, under any plausible scenario it will still be heavily managed by the PBOC. The central bank will be buying the renminbi in response to temporary depreciations and selling it when the currency starts appreciating to an undesirable extent. The idea that ºoating should be delayed until the 56 Asian Economic Papers
Change in the Renminbi Exchange Rate 11 This simple model in which the exchange rate adjusts to clear the current account (or the basic balance, including also long-term capital ºows) may be an inappropriate analytical tool for a setting of high capital mobility, but it is a perfectly ªne basis for understanding exchange rate determination in a country with capital controls. Presumably a hybrid model is appropriate for a country whose capital controls are only partially effective. And to the extent that export supplies and import demands are less volatile than ªnancial market conditions, so too will be the exchange rate under such conditions. capital account is signiªcantly liberalized in order to limit the currency's volatility would make sense if we were talking about a free ºoat. But this is not what most analysts are advocating. 12 Rather, most observers have in mind a managed ºoat such that the central bank provides the liquidity that international ªnancial markets cannot.
The other rationale for delaying the transition until the capital account has been signiªcantly liberalized is that capital controls prevent ªrms from using ªnancial instruments to insulate themselves from the effects of currency ºuctuations. Firms import inputs as part of the process of producing and selling exports, and the absence of an onshore market in currency forwards and futures would prevent them from insuring themselves against unexpected currency ºuctuations during the production process. Similarly, ªrms make capital investments now by borrowing domestic currency to build the capacity to export later; an unexpected change in the exchange rate that reduces the domestic-currency price of exports can wreak havoc on balance sheets unless the ªrms in question have foreign-currency liabilities, obtained on foreign ªnancial markets or from foreign ªnancial institutions, presuming prudential limits on the currency mismatches of domestic ªnancial institutions. Again, hedging currency exposure in this way will be impossible in the absence of capital account liberalization.
I have already indicated reasons for not taking these arguments too far. The majority of Chinese exports are produced by multinational companies and their joint venture partners, who can self-insure against such risks. In addition, the central bank, by managing the ºoat to prevent excessive ºuctuations, will limit ªnancial dislocations for exporters. The literature on "fear of ºoating" (e.g., Calvo and Reinhart 2002) points to precisely this desire to limit balance sheet dislocations as an explanation for the prevalence of heavily managed ºoating in emerging markets.
Moving now to a managed float
These arguments suggest that China should not wait to open its capital account before moving to a managed ºoat. Precisely when to move to greater ºexibility is a more difªcult question; rigorous analyses of the optimal sequencing of capital account liberalization and exchange rate ºexibility are few. Part of the problem is that the capital account regime is treated in the theoretical literature as a dichotomous variable, but in reality there is a continuum of stages of capital account openness that range from fully closed to fully open. We know that a country with a fully closed capital account has good reason to peg its currency. Hedging opportunities for exporters and importers being nonexistent, ºexibility would be disruptive. We also know that a country with a fully open capital account will want to move to some form of greater exchange rate ºexibility, except in a few very exceptional cases (e.g., the case of Hong Kong, discussed below). Indeed, some analysts (e.g., Fischer 2003) regard moving to managed ºexibility as an essential precondition for full capital account liberalization.
My view is that capital account liberalization has gone far enough that China should move now to a more ºexible exchange rate. The events of 2002-03 and econometric studies such as those by Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2003) suggest that the capital account has grown sufªciently porous to seriously limit the authorities' room for maneuver. 13 And given the risks of attempting to reconcile a liberal capital account with a pegged exchange rate, going further in the direction of capital account liberalization before moving to greater currency ºexibility would create more problems than it solves.
In addition, experience suggests that when the capital account becomes moderately open, there is a spontaneous tendency for it to open further. Remaining controls weaken whether the authorities like it or not. Economically, opening some channels for capital ºows creates additional avenues through which market participants can evade remaining restrictions. 14 Politically, allowing residents and foreigners to engage in some international ªnancial transactions creates interest groups that lobby for the removal of restrictions on other such transactions. In China's case, the simple fact that the country is becoming more integrated with the global economy, leading to its accession to the World Trade Organization, creates obligations (such as national treatment for foreign banks) implying a more porous capital account. All these are reasons for the Chinese authorities not to delay in moving to a managed ºoat.
Moving directly from the peg to a managed ºoat will simplify the adjustment to the new regime. It will diminish the need to assume that the authorities somehow know 58 Asian Economic Papers Change in the Renminbi Exchange Rate 13 Others, for example Merrill Lynch (2004, 3) , reach the same conclusion: "The 'closed' capital account is clearly showing signs of leakage. . . . Intervention required to offset these ºows is simply too large to easily sterilise and, as a result, the external imbalance is generating internal discord." the precise magnitude of any overvaluation. If the initial decision is to allow the currency to drift up by, say, 5 percent, but this turns out to do too little to slow the accumulation of reserves and to prevent the economy from overheating, then the authorities can engage in further open-market sales to push the exchange rate up a bit further. An initial adjustment that is too small does less to damage credibility, putting the authorities in an unsustainable position, when the new regime is a shift to a market-determined exchange rate that can adjust to changing circumstances than when it is a hard-and-fast peg that will supposedly be set and held. Since the currency can appreciate as well as depreciate, this two-way bet will deter speculators from all lining up on one side of the market, and the problem of anticipatory capital inºows will be less severe. If economic conditions change and market pressures cause the exchange rate to move, then the authorities can use that information and lean against the wind harder or softer depending on whether they see the change in conditions as temporary or permanent. Thus, shifting to a managed ºoat does not relieve the authorities of the need to have a view of the appropriate level or range for the exchange rate, although they can now make that view contingent on current conditions and adapt it to new information (this being the essence of what is meant by greater ºexibility).
Anchoring monetary policy
Much of this paper, like the surrounding debate, is framed in terms of the choice of the exchange rate regime, but the real question is the underlying objectives of monetary policy. Once upon a time, when normal instruments of monetary management were unavailable and exports were the only dynamic sector, it made sense to organize monetary policy around the currency peg. Exports determined economic growth and were strongly affected by the exchange rate. At the end of China's period of high inºation, the exchange rate was also the logical anchor for the price level. But these conditions no longer hold. Exports are no longer the exclusive driver of growth; the sources of demand for Chinese production have become more diversiªed. Price stability is well established, and an exchange rate peg is no longer the obvious focal point for monetary policy. As the capital account has grown more porous, capital displays a greater tendency to ºow into the country when domestic and foreign interest rates diverge, limiting the authorities' room for maneuver. As economic liberalization continues, creating new channels through which foreign capital can ºow into the property market and other segments of the economy, the authorities' attempts to regulate money and credit conditions by issuing directives to the "Big Four" state-owned commercial banks (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Agricultural Bank of China) become increasingly ineffectual.
All this suggests that China needs to move to a more conventional monetary regime in which interest rates are tailored to domestic conditions and can diverge from world interest rates because the exchange rate is allowed to move. That the country possesses an interbank market and a central bank that engages in open-market operations suggests that it is possible to regularize monetary policy in this way. Some will object that China lacks market-determined interest rates-that lending and deposit rates are still set by the central bank. However, on 1 January 2004, banks gained greater ºexibility in terms of setting rates at variance with the central bank's pegs. Even if rates on some loans are still limited by ofªcial ceilings, it is rates on market-determined loans to private-owned ªrms and other customers that matter on the margin. And to the extent that increasing amounts of credit in any case circumvent the banking system completely, the absence of market-determined bank lending and deposit rates becomes less of an issue; those credit ºows can only be shaped by adjusting interest rates. Another way of putting the point is that the authorities are going to have abandon their practice of setting bank lending and deposit rates at nonmarket levels sooner rather than later.
To say that the PBOC should focus on growth and inºation does not mean that it can neglect exchange rate movements. How much weight it should put on the exchange rate in its reaction function and how widely the currency should be allowed to ºuctuate should depend, in standard open-economy fashion, on the responsiveness of growth and inºation to shocks and the nature and magnitude of the speciªc shocks to which the economy is exposed (see, e.g., Ball 1999). To repeat, the PBOC should think of itself as maximizing an objective function whose arguments are deviations from the target rate of inºation and the sustainable rate of growth.
To many, this regime will sound like an informal version of open-economy inºation targeting, which of course is what it is. I am not arguing that China should immediately adopt the full apparatus of formal inºation targeting, complete with issuance of an inºation report and a transparent policymaking process. It is unlikely that Chinese ofªcials would welcome the requisite levels of transparency. But it is not clear that the entire formal apparatus is required to make this regime a success. In fact, countries (such as Peru) that have adopted the relevant objective function and monetary policy operating strategy without also installing the complete apparatus have shown that this informal approach to inºation targeting can work. The PBOC already forecasts inºation and growth. China does not suffer from a problem of ªscal dominance like that which has prevented the operation of such regimes in other times and places. How much the exchange rate moves in this new regime will depend on the nature of shocks. Since these vary over time, it makes no sense to frame policy in terms of a time-invariant ºuctuation band. Thus, I do not see widening the width of the current ºuctuation band as an effective way for the Chinese authorities to enhance their monetary control. If the band is widened slightly, say from plus or minus 0.3 percent to plus or minus 3.0 percent, there will remain the potential for conºict between the immediate goal of limiting exchange rate ºexibility and the deeper objective of achieving low inºation and sustainable growth. It then may be necessary to shift the central parity again, with all the difªculties and undesirable properties of a step revaluation. If the band is widened signiªcantly more than this, then it will no longer serve as a guide for monetary policy (as I argue in this paper it no longer should). It is then best done away with. This is where I differ from Goldstein and Lardy (2003) , who argue for retaining a relatively narrow tolerance interval for ºuctuations and an exchange-rate-centered monetary policy until the ªnancial sector is ªrst strengthened and the capital account is opened further. Some will say that my argument for a managed ºoat and their argument for an exchange rate band are not really that different. After all, Chinese ofªcials already refer to their very narrow band against the dollar as ºoating. Still, I differ from Goldstein and Lardy in advocating the immediate abandonment of an exchange-rate-centered monetary policy and a higher degree of exchange rate ºexibility than they believe the Chinese economy would beneªt from at present.
To repeat, shunning a band need not mean that the exchange rate will ºuctuate wildly. The rate should be managed to limit the currency's movement. But the extent of permissible ºuctuations should be a function of the shocks to which the economy is subjected, not of the width of a predetermined ºuctuation band.
Abstractions are well and good, but the proof of the pudding is in the eating. If threats to the stability of the banking system are ignored until they ªnally explode, with serious adverse consequences for public sector ªnances, the PBOC's commitment to low inºation could be placed at risk. But so too would any other monetary policy regime, including one predicated on the continued maintenance of a currency peg. Although these are not arguments against a more ºexible exchange rate per se, they point to the need for resolving problems in the state enterprise and banking sectors as quickly as possible so that the pursuit of a stable monetary policy, whatever the regime, is not placed at risk.
by Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2003) , this in turn implies the need for single-digit appreciation against the dollar (assuming no other changes in prevailing conditions, an assumption to which I return below). This would help to cool down inºationary pressures without slowing growth more than marginally. It would not necessarily balance China's current account, but current account balance is not an appropriate target for monetary policy. It will not solve the U.S. current account problem, but the solution to that problem must be found in the United States, not in China.
At the time of writing, a number of observers are forecasting the need for a signiªcant additional decline in the dollar to narrow the U.S. current account deªcit. Calculations in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) suggest that the dollar may have to fall by another 30 percent on a trade-weighted basis to return the U.S. current account to a sustainable path. Whether this adjustment will occur gradually over time or all at once is hotly debated. We need not resolve that debate here. The point is that the outcome has implications for Chinese monetary and exchange rate policy. A fall in the U.S. dollar by a few percentage points a year going forward will not have ªrst-order implications for Chinese monetary policy. But if the dollar were to fall by 30 percent tomorrow, that would have major implications for the appropriate value of the renminbi against the dollar. A quick fall of the renminbi by 30 percent or more against the euro and the yen (more, actually, since if China follows, the dollar would then have to fall by still more against those currencies in order to achieve a 30 percent depreciation on a trade-weighted basis) would fan demand and inºation. This is a perfect illustration of why it is not sensible to focus discussions of policy reform on the magnitude of China's step revaluation. The extent to which the renminbi should be allowed to ºoat upward against the dollar should depend, rather, on the shocks to which the economy is subjected-shocks that are intrinsically uncertain. What is essential is for China to obtain the additional ºexibility necessary to respond optimally to those shocks. A change in exchange rate regime in the direction of managed ºoating provides that ºexibility. Revaluing the renminbi by, say, 25 percent against the dollar does not. 
Potential objections
It is worth reviewing other potential objections to this recommendation. First, it is argued that China should not abandon a peg that served it so well in the 1997-98 Second, it is argued by Garber (2003) that China should not abandon its peg because it still has massive amounts of underemployed labor to absorb into the modern industrial sector and continued rapid export growth is the only feasible way of doing so. But this is an argument for a competitive exchange rate, not for a peg. It is an argument against a large step revaluation and in favor of continuing to lean against the wind if the currency shows an undue tendency to appreciate, not an argument against managed ºexibility. Indeed, managed ºexibility would be useful for preventing serious overheating, such as that evident in the ªnal months of 2003, which can result in a boom-and-bust cycle that bequeaths a legacy of nonperforming investments, undermining investor conªdence. Such macroeconomic instability would not be good in the long run for the more rapid absorption of underemployed labor in the modern sector.
Third, it is argued that allowing the exchange rate to appreciate would cause substantial capital losses on the country's foreign-exchange reserves. 18 But this is an objection to any change in the exchange rate regime that results in renminbi appreciation, not against my particular proposal. To the extent that the present proposal, which emphasizes the need for greater ºexibility rather than for a substantial onetime appreciation, might mean a more limited change in the level of the currency in the short run, the consequent capital losses would be less.
Fourth, and ªnally, there is the argument that the peg is good for China's neighbors and that a more ºexible renminbi would cause distress elsewhere in Asia. It is to this aspect of the problem that I now turn.
Implications for other Asian countries
Assessing the impact of a change in the renminbi exchange rate on the rest of Asia is no easy task. Not only is there disagreement about how China will be affected, but
there is confusion about how the impact will be felt by the country's neighbors. On the assumption that China will continue to experience inºationary pressure, the PBOC will want to tighten monetary policy, which will imply some strengthening of the exchange rate going forward. The result will be a slight slowdown in the rate of economic growth relative to what would have obtained otherwise. As argued above, the large imported-input component of Chinese exports suggests that the impact on exports will be less than would be expected in a number of other countries. Similarly, the declining dependence of Chinese exports on the low cost of unskilled labor suggests that the impact will be smaller than might have been the case previously.
This change in relative prices will lead to a reallocation of resources from the production of traded to nontraded goods (relative to the benchmark in which the exchange rate remains unchanged). Together with the elasticity of export growth with respect to GDP growth, this suggests that the change in the rate of growth of exports will be larger than the change in the rate of growth of the production of goods and services. (Historically, the change in the export growth rate relative to the change in the GDP growth rate is on the order of two to three.) As export growth and GDP growth slow down at least slightly, so will the volume of inward FDI.
The rise in relative unit labor costs will accelerate the country's move out of unskilled-labor-intensive exports into products for which labor costs matter less. It will speed the shift from the production of light manufactures (e.g., apparel) into the production of ªnished capital goods (e.g., data processing and ofªce equipment, telecommunications equipment, and electrical machinery).
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This implies that the impact on the country's Asian neighbors will be uneven. On the one hand, low-income countries such as Cambodia, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan that compete with China in the production of unskilled-laborintensive light manufactures will beneªt from the increase in China's relative unit labor costs and the country's shift into more technologically advanced, highervalue-added product lines. These are the countries whose exports, broken down by industry, have the highest rank correlation with Chinese exports. 20 The same may be 64
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Change in the Renminbi Exchange Rate 19 I am not suggesting that China will abandon the production of unskilled-labor-intensive goods. Continuing reform of state-owned enterprises and agriculture will produce additional supplies of unskilled labor, especially in the western regions of the country. I am suggesting that these trends will be affected on the margin by a somewhat stronger exchange rate.
true of India, though less so insofar as the two countries specialize in different products (in apparel, for example, India specializes in undergarments whereas China specializes in outer garments). That China has as many as 200 million underemployed workers in agriculture and state enterprises yet to be absorbed into the modern sector, a signiªcant fraction of whom will ªnd work in export industries, suggests that the impact will not be great. Still, this logic suggests that the leastdeveloped Asian countries will beneªt, ceteris paribus.
The next tier of Asian countries will also feel the repercussions of higher Chinese labor costs, modestly relieving the pressure felt by their light manufacturing. But they will be less favorably affected insofar as the change in Chinese exchange rate policy will accelerate that country's move up the technology ladder into the production of more sophisticated goods. Here I have in mind countries such as Thailand, with which China increasingly competes in the production of higher-valued-added products such as household appliances and electrical machinery. Malaysia is plausibly in this group insofar as it competes with China both in light manufactures (nontextile clothing, furniture, and textile yarn) and in capital goods (automatic data processing machinery, electrical machinery, semiconductors, telecom parts and equipment, radio receivers, and transistors) but has yet to move up the technology ladder to the same extent as Japan and the newly industrializing economies (NIEs). 21 For present purposes we can assume that the positive impact on unskilled-labor-intensive industries and the negative impact on more skilled-labor-intensive industries roughly cancel one another out.
The region's most advanced economies will feel mainly negative effects. Eventually China will compete with them in the production of technologically sophisticated inputs and capital goods, but that evolution will not be noticeably accelerated by the limited change in China's exchange rate contemplated here. This means that they will feel essentially no impact of the induced increase in Chinese labor costs. The main way they will feel the change in exchange rate policy is as a deceleration in Chinese growth (relative to what would have happened otherwise), which will reduce the demand for their exports of capital goods. 22 Here I have in mind exports from Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan of parts and components for the assembly of consumer electronics and information technology (IT) hardware (but also high-quality textiles, machinery, equipment, and petrochemicals used in the production of other manufactures). 23 In the ªrst 9 months of 2003, China accounted for 36 percent of total export growth in the case of South Korea, 32 percent in the case of Japan, and 68 percent in the case of Taiwan. 24 This is one basis for forecasting how these countries will feel the change in the rate of growth of Chinese manufacturing and exports. This picture can of course be made more complicated by those with a taste for detail. For example, some of Asia's less-developed countries export not only light manufactures to third markets but also energy products and agricultural staples to China; they will therefore feel some negative effects from the deceleration in Chinese growth. 25 Still, the basic story implies an improvement in international competitiveness for Asia's low-income countries, a negligible net impact on the middle tier, and a negative impact on the upper tier.
Note that the implications of this analysis of regional repercussions are very different than those suggested in prior discussions. For example, contrary to the presumption of Bergsten (2004), it is not clear that a stronger renminbi will cause the dollar to depreciate against the currencies of the other advanced Asian economies (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan). 26 In addition, there is unlikely to be much impact on the currencies of middle-income Asian countries whose exports to the United States are also growing rapidly. This has obvious implications for the debate over global adjustment. A further argument, often heard, for allowing the renminbi to adjust upward is that China, in formulating its exchange rate policy, should consider not merely its own internal needs, but also the global implications.
As an increasingly large player on global markets, the country should be aware of its responsibility for the constructive correction of global imbalances. Conventional wisdom on this topic holds: ªrst, that Asian currencies need to appreciate against the dollar in order to help correct the U.S. current account deªcit without placing intolerable pressure on the European economy; and, second, that with appreciation of the renminbi against the dollar, other Asian countries will be willing to allow their currencies to appreciate against the dollar as well. 27 In fact, the analysis here suggests that appreciation of the renminbi will not put upward pressure on the yen, won, and new Taiwan dollar. Whether the net effect of a stronger renminbi, including these additional repercussions, would be positive or negative for the U.S. current account deªcit is uncertain. In my view, the main argument for a change in Chinese exchange rate policy stems from China's own domestic needs, not from any responsibility the country might have in helping to solve America's current account problem. For the United States, the solution to that problem lies at home.
The magnitude of the effects on the rest of Asia should not be exaggerated. Given the high imported-input content of Chinese exports of consumer electronics and IT hardware (as high as 84 percent by some estimates), it is unlikely that the rate of growth of Chinese exports will slow dramatically even in the wake of a large devaluation. Hence there is unlikely to be a large impact on the country's neighbors. But what is critical to my discussion is not the magnitude but the direction of the effects-because previous analyses have suggested that a revaluation of the renminbi will lead to a generalized revaluation of Asian currencies.
Four sources of evidence are consistent with my conclusions. First, there are simulation analyses of the impact of China's emergence on the trade and growth of other countries. Such studies generally take China's accession to the WTO as the comparative-statics experiment under consideration. To a ªrst approximation, the effects of China's accession to the WTO increase the country's export market access and increase the access of other suppliers to China's home market, thus operating like a revaluation in reverse. Ianchovichina and Walmsley (2003) ªnd that China's WTO access reduces the exports and therefore the GDP of Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia (mainly as a result of the negative impact on their textile and apparel exports). A revaluation, which would raise Chinese labor costs and reduce the country's competitiveness in these sectors, would have precisely the opposite effects. Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), mainly because of increases in their exports to China of high-quality textile and electronics inputs (along with miscellaneous exports of processing industries). 28 Again this suggests that a renminbi revaluation would have a negative impact on these countries. On the other hand, Ianchovichina and Walmsley's simulations suggest a decline in exports (mainly of textiles and apparel) and a reduction in GDP, relative to baseline levels, in East Asia's developing countries. Similarly, Yang and Vines (2000) simulate the impact of China's growth on exports from other developing countries and ªnd that those of the ASEAN countries fall slightly while those of Japan and the NIEs both rise. 29 Again, note that a stronger renminbi that translates into somewhat slower Chinese growth in general and Chinese export growth in particular is tantamount to running this experiment in reverse.
Second, there is the econometric study of Ahearne et al. (2003) Ianchovichina and Walmsley (2003, 11) summarize their results, "Japan and the newly industrialized economies in East Asia will also beneªt from China's accession to the WTO. . . . As important suppliers of materials to China, these countries will observe an improvement in their terms of trade and returns to capital." In both Japan and the NIEs, the projected increases in production are driven mainly by expansion in exports to China. Looking closely at Ianchovichina and Walmsley's results, it is not clear in fact that this conclusion carries over to Singapore, because of a large and mysterious fall in projected exports of beverages and tobacco.
29 These overall effects are the sum of positive effects on exports to China itself and negative effects on exports to third markets, which differ in size depending on the Asian exporter concerned (as emphasized in my discussion above).
hypothesis suggests that one would ªnd a negative coefªcient when estimating the same equation for low-income Asian countries such as Cambodia, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. I do not know whether this is the case. But note that this is not the sample for which my results would be regarded as debatable. Rather, it is the positive correlation between China's exports and the export performance of high-income Asian countries that the advocates of yen revaluation to achieve global adjustment and U.S. current account rebalancing would regard as so controversial. Two further issues are worth noting in this context. The ªrst one concerns Hong Kong. Essentially, Hong Kong is in the same situation as East Asia's other highincome countries, exporting high-quality textiles and other inputs utilized in Chinese manufacturing. Like Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, it will suffer from the slowdown in Chinese growth and declining demand for its exports of in-termediate goods. In addition, insofar as Hong Kong remains an important entrepôt center, any deceleration of Chinese export growth will have an especially pronounced negative impact. On the other hand, Hong Kong stands to beneªt disproportionately from the increase in Chinese tourism resulting from the increased purchasing power of the renminbi. The net effect is uncertain.
Then there are the implications for Hong Kong's currency board. Hong Kong's dollar peg has been especially convenient because the renminbi has also been tied to the dollar. When the renminbi begins to ºoat, the authorities will undoubtedly revisit this policy. An economy as small and open as Hong Kong has no wish to ºoat. Pegging to the dollar has proven value but will grow less appealing as Hong Kong becomes even more economically interdependent with the Pearl River Delta and less interdependent with the United States. Shifting to a renminbi peg (or adopting the renminbi) is inevitable in the very long run. In the short run, abandoning the dollar peg would be a considerable shock to conªdence. A possible compromise for the medium term would be to contemplate a basket peg with equal weights on the dollar and the renminbi.
This brings us to the ªnal issue, namely, proposals for a common basket or singlecurrency peg for Asian countries. The fact that the competitiveness and exchange rates of different Asian countries will be affected in different ways casts doubt on the notion that the region should respond with some kind of collective exchange rate arrangement. A common peg is not obviously desirable for a group of countries that will be affected in opposite directions by this common shock. A single-currency peg for East Asia excluding Japan, whether to the yen or the dollar, makes no sense when some countries will see their competitiveness enhanced by the change in Chinese exchange rate policy while others will see their competitiveness decline. A basket peg makes no more sense, insofar as different countries, which are affected in opposite directions, all peg to the same basket. Nor is it clear in which direction a basket with, say, equal weights on the yen, dollar, and euro will move. Insofar as capital goods industries in the United States and Europe are less dependent on exports of equipment to China than such industries in Japan, the deceleration in Chinese growth might lead to some strengthening of the dollar and euro against the yen. Yet even the direction, much less the magnitude, of the resulting change in an equally weighted basket is impossible to predict.
From this point of view, it makes no sense to attempt to manage Asian exchange rates in the wake of the change in Chinese policy to prevent intra-regional ºuctuations. Better than tying monetary policy to the dollar, the yen, a G-3 basket, or one another's currencies would be for the monetary authorities of each Asian country to focus on inºation and the output gap and to adjust interest rates and intervene in the foreign-exchange market to target desirable levels for these variables.
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Conclusion
The dollar peg has served China well. At a time when the economy was suffering from severe inºationary imbalances, just beginning to grow its exports, and tightly controlling its capital account, pegging the currency made sense. But now that inºation has been brought down to single digits, exports are roaring ahead, and the capital account is becoming increasingly porous, the case for the peg is less compelling. The Chinese authorities need to be able to tailor monetary, ªnancial, and currency market conditions to local needs. The costs of not doing so are evident in excessive rates of growth of money and bank credit, which create the dangers of overheating, investment excesses, and further problems in the ªnancial sector. Serious problems have been averted, so far, by open-market operations and regulatory restraints on bank lending. But it is important to recognize that the ability to control money and credit conditions will weaken further as the opening and liberalization of the Chinese economy renders the capital account of the balance of payments increasingly permeable. Open-market operations will change the composition of the monetary base but not the rate of growth of the money supply. As more channels develop linking domestic markets to ªnancial markets in the rest of the world, attempting to regulate the growth of money and credit by issuing directives to the banks will become less effective. The authorities will only be able to adjust money and credit conditions to domestic needs if they allow the exchange rate to vary.
Chinese ofªcials acknowledge these arguments but prefer to leave the adjustment for another day. They are reluctant to tamper with success. They fear that a stronger currency could mean slower growth, aggravating the political problems associated with unemployment. They worry about the banks' ability to cope. They instinctively resist pressure from abroad.
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Change in the Renminbi Exchange Rate 35 Exactly how much the exchange rate should be allowed to vary will depend not only on the structure of the real and ªnancial sectors (the responsiveness of exports and the extent of currency mismatches on balance sheets) but also on the nature of the shocks to which the economy is subject. (See Eichengreen 2002 .) It is impossible to answer the question of how much Asia's managed exchange rates should be allowed to ºuctuate without knowing the magnitude of these parameters and disturbances.
Though there is never a convenient time to alter the exchange rate regime, the authorities should ignore ill-timed American pressure and move to a more ºexible exchange rate now. The capital account is growing more permeable, independent of ofªcial regulations. As Chinese companies do more business offshore and foreign companies do more business in China, there will be even more scope for leads and lags. Accession to WTO will open the Chinese market to foreign banks, creating additional channels for capital ºows. Political liberalization will make it easier for residents to travel and take money with them. A more porous capital account will make the currency peg even more inconvenient and fragile. It will be harder to move to a managed ºoat without disturbing conªdence if the decision is made under duress, when capital is ºowing out rather than ºowing in, growth has slowed, and there are open problems in the banking system.
By moving further in the direction of capital account liberalization before adopting a more ºexible exchange rate, the authorities are heightening these dangers. They are strengthening the country's dependence on foreign ªnancial conditions and giving the central bank even less leeway to tailor its policies to domestic needs. They are encouraging procyclical, destabilizing capital ºows by creating one-way bets for speculators.
Compared with these costs and risks, the standard arguments against moving to a more ºexible exchange rate are unconvincing. Chinese commercial banks may be awash with bad loans, and their risk management systems may be inadequate, making bank restructuring an urgent priority, but it is not clear that a somewhat more ºexible exchange rate will signiªcantly compound their problems. In contrast, a more porous capital account will heighten these dangers, making it important that this be accompanied by bank recapitalization and strengthened supervision to prevent excessive risk taking. Limits on capital account transactions will prevent enterprises from using ªnancial instruments to hedge against currency ºuctuations, but the majority of exporting ªrms exposed to such ºuctuations are multinational enterprises or joint venture partners capable of self-insuring against these risks.
For domestic private companies, these risks can be limited if the central bank manages the exchange rate to prevent excessive ºuctuations. Thus, the argument for a more ºexible exchange rate is not an argument for a freely ºexible exchange rate. For the foreseeable future, the best exchange rate regime for China will remain a heavily managed ºoat. The PBOC can conduct open-market operations in shortterm bills and has an interbank market in which to operate. There is no reason why it should not be able to manage the exchange rate in a manner consistent with its inºation and growth targets.
Because Chinese exports have such a large imported-input component, the impact of appreciation is likely to be less than that in many other countries. To the extent that the argument here is for an exchange rate that is gradually permitted to ºuctuate more freely rather than for a substantial step revaluation of the currency, the short-run impact on exports will be smaller still. There would presumably be a slight decline in the rate of growth, concentrated in periods when the Chinese economy threatened to overheat, but this would be a welcome manifestation of heightened stability. There would be some shift from the production of traded to nontraded goods and a somewhat greater tendency for Chinese ªrms to move toward the production of more skilled-labor-intensive, technologically sophisticated goods, none of which is obviously unwelcome. If the shift to the new exchange rate regime is completed in a timely fashion, there is no reason to think that these changes would be overly disruptive.
This in turn suggests that the impact on other Asian countries will not be overwhelming. But those effects will be diverse: they will be modestly positive for the region's low-income economies and modestly negative for its high-income countries. Insofar as the competitiveness of the two sets of economies is affected in opposite directions, the pressure on their currencies and the desirable direction of exchange rate adjustment will similarly be different. From this point of view, it makes no sense to attempt to manage Asian exchange rates in the wake of the change in Chinese policy so as to prevent intra-regional ºuctuations.
